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Abstract
Human cognitive capacity includes recursively definable concepts, which are prevalent in domains involving lists, numbers,
and languages. Cognitive science currently lacks a satisfactory explanation for the systematic nature of such capacities (i.e.,
why the capacity for some recursive cognitive abilities–e.g., finding the smallest number in a list–implies the capacity for
certain others–finding the largest number, given knowledge of number order). The category-theoretic constructs of initial F-
algebra, catamorphism, and their duals, final coalgebra and anamorphism provide a formal, systematic treatment of
recursion in computer science. Here, we use this formalism to explain the systematicity of recursive cognitive capacities
without ad hoc assumptions (i.e., to the same explanatory standard used in our account of systematicity for non-recursive
capacities). The presence of an initial algebra/final coalgebra explains systematicity because all recursive cognitive
capacities, in the domain of interest, factor through (are composed of) the same component process. Moreover, this
factorization is unique, hence no further (ad hoc) assumptions are required to establish the intrinsic connection between
members of a group of systematically-related capacities. This formulation also provides a new perspective on the
relationship between recursive cognitive capacities. In particular, the link between number and language does not depend
on recursion, as such, but on the underlying functor on which the group of recursive capacities is based. Thus, many species
(and infants) can employ recursive processes without having a full-blown capacity for number and language.
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Introduction
Many cognitive domains include recursively definable concepts
(i.e., concepts defined with reference to themselves), such as
domains involving lists, numbers, or languages. In card games, for
example, a deck of cards can be defined (recursively) as a top card
(perhaps turned face up to reveal its value) and a (remaining) deck
of cards. To include finite decks, the definition has an alternative
clause specifying an empty deck; that is, a deck is either empty, or
contains a top card and a (smaller) deck. Operations on recursively
defined concepts may also be defined recursively. For example,
removing jokers from a deck of cards can be defined (recursively)
as removing the top card if it is a joker and then removing jokers
from the remaining deck of cards. Given that you don’t find
people who can remove the jokers from a hand of seven cards
without being able to remove jokers from a deck of fifty-three,
recursion-related capacities are further instances (see below) of the
systematic nature of human cognition.
Systematicity is a property of human cognitive architecture (i.e.,
the basic processes and modes of composition that together afford
cognition) whereby cognitive capacity is organized around groups
of related abilities. A standard example since the original
formulation of the problem [1] has been that you don’t find
people with the capacity to infer John as the lover from the
statement John loves Mary without having the capacity to infer Mary
as the lover from the related statement Mary loves John. In general,
an instance of systematicity is when a cognizer has cognitive
capacity c1 if and only if the cognizer has cognitive capacity c2 (see
[2]). In this format, we say, e.g., that systematicity is evident where
one has the capacity to remove the jokers if and only if one has the
capacity to remove the aces (assuming, of course, one has the
capacity to identify jokers and aces).
The classical explanation for systematicity has two components:
(1) combinatorial syntactically structured representations; and (2)
processes that are sensitive to (i.e., compatible with) those syntactic
structures. In a classical cognitive architecture, mental represen-
tations of constituent entities (e.g., John, Mary) are tokened
(instantiated) whenever the mental representations of their
complex hosts (e.g., John loves Mary) are tokened, with the meaning
of a complex host representation obtained (recursively) from the
meaning assigned to its constituent mental representations and
their syntactic relationships. By analogy to language, this form of
mental representation is called a language of thought (LoT) [3].
The three aspects of systematicity, i.e., systematicity of representation,
systematicity of inference, and compositionality of representation [1], can
often be derived from classical cognitive architectures, because the
same component processes are often used for each and every
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instance, a classical system has the capacity to represent John loves
Mary if and only if the system has a capacity to represent Mary loves
John when the common component process is something like a
production rule: S?AgentlovesPatient (where John and Mary can
both be produced from Agent and Patient by other production
rules)–systematicity of representation. Likewise, a classical system
has the capacity to infer John as the lover in John loves Mary if and
only if it has the capacity to infer Mary as the lover in Mary loves
John given a common process that is sensitive to the syntactic
structure whereby the lover constituent is represented by the first
token–systematicity of inference. Also, the capacity to assign the
semantic content of John being the lover of Mary to the
representation John loves Mary if and only if there is the capacity
to assign the semantic content of Mary being the lover of John to
the representation Mary loves John derives from the tokening
principle (above) mediating classical representations and processes:
the process for juxtaposing tokens (symbols) John, loves, and Mary to
form John loves Mary with corresponding semantic content is the
same process that is used to form Mary loves John with
corresponding content.
Classical compositionality would seem to provide an elegant
explanation for systematicity with regard to recursive capacities,
even though it fails to provide a full account of systematicity
generally [4]. (Classical theory fails to provide a complete
explanation because one can construct syntactically compositional
systems that support some but not all members of a group of
systematically-related cognitive capacities. Additional, so-called ad
hoc, assumptions are needed to derive only those classical cognitive
architectures that support systematicity–see [4] for an extensive
and detailed analysis. This problem for classical theory echoes the
one originally raised against connectionism as a theory of cognitive
architecture [1,5].) For recursive definitions, like the deck of cards,
one self-referencing rule typically covers all cases (bar the
terminating case, such as the empty deck). For example, removing
jokers from a single hand, or an entire deck invokes the same
component process. The two tasks only differ in the number of
recursive steps.
Classical compositionality without systematicity for
recursion
However, the classical explanation with regard to recursive
capacities still suffers the same general problem (illustrated below)
that it suffers for non-recursive capacities. Suppose one card game
requires removing the lowest value card in the hand dealt, while
another card game requires removing the highest value card. In
schema terms, given knowledge of the relative value of the cards, a
person has the capacity to remove the lowest valued card if and
only if a person has the capacity to remove the highest valued
card, given that they know the relative values of each card. In
everyday terms, you never come across card players who can play
one of the games, but not the other. Classical theory admits at least
two general schemes for realizing these capacities, recursive and
non-recursive iteration, without requiring that they share a
common component process. Hence, classical theory admits the
case of having one capacity without having the other. Moreover,
even under restriction to a single recursive (or, non-recursive)
scheme, there remains an assumption that the processes for
making inferences from representations of recursively-definable
entities are compatible with the processes for building those
representations (see [6]). For these reasons, classical theory does
not provide a complete explanation of systematicity, even for
recursively defined capacities.
To illustrate the problem just outlined, suppose the following
recursive procedure, lowest, for identifying the lowest valued card
in a deck of cards (containing at least one card):
lowest(c : cs)~lower(c,lowest(cs))
lowest(c : ½ )~c
where a deck of cards c : cs is represented by a recursively defined
list with c as the top card and cs as the remaining deck, ½  is the
empty deck, and lower returns the lower of two cards. Suppose,
also, the following classical non-recursive procedure, highest, for
identifying the highest valued card:
highest(cs)~(i,high)/(0,undefined)
while ivn do
(i,high)/(iz1,higher(high,csi))
return high
where deck cs is represented by an array of n cards with position
indexed by i (i.e., csi is the ith card), high maintains a
representation of the (currently) highest card, higher returns the
higher of two cards (undefined is some value guaranteed to be
lower than any card), and / indicates variable-value assignment.
Clearly, the two procedures do not share any component
processes, and so do not provide a basis for systematicity, even
though systematicity could be supported when both tasks are
implemented in either the first style only, or the second style only.
(In fact, entire programming languages have been designed to
support only the first–e.g., Haskell–or only the second–e.g., Basic–
style of recursion/iteration.) Notice that we are not unfairly
stressing classical theory by apportioning capacity at the level of
constituents–systematicity concerns ‘‘molecular’’, not ‘‘atomic’’
capacities [1]. Rather, given constituent capacities lower and higher,
classical theory admits two independent compositional forms, as
the example illustrates. Notice, also, that even when confined to
recursive or iterative style, there is still the assumption that the
deck of cards is represented in a particular order. Item order is
crucial for, say, recalling the first item. An architecture that
constructs lists with one order, but accesses them assuming another
will fail to exhibit systematicity. This further problem is an analog
of the one highlighted for the classical explanation in regard to
non-recursively defined entities [6].
Category theory explanation of (non-)recursive
systematicity: outline
An explanation for non-recursive systematicity without ad hoc
assumptions was given in [6,7], using a branch of mathematics
called category theory [8]. Briefly (and informally), our category
theory explanation supposes that building blocks of a (categorial)
cognitive architecture are ‘‘universal constructions’’. In effect, a
universal construction guarantees that each and every morphism
(cognitive process) in the category (cognitive domain) of interest
factors through (is composed of) a universal arrow (common
component process) in a unique way (without requiring additional
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systematicity are avoided because uniqueness is a built-in part of
universal constructions. In this paper, we extend our category
theory explanation to recursive capacities using universal con-
structions called an initial F-algebra and a final F-coalgebra, which
have been extensively developed in computer science as a
theoretical basis for recursive computations [9–12]. Our previous
work [6,7] dealt with non-recursive domains using a kind of
universal construction called adjoint functors–a functor is a way
relating categories, which can be viewed as a way of constructing
objects and morphisms from one category based on those in
another. The current work uses endofunctors, which relate categories
to themselves, hence their relevance to recursion: from an initial F-
algebra on an endofunctor F we get systematicity of inference;
from the associated final F-coalgebra on the same endofunctor we
get systematicity of representation; and from endofunctors
composed of category-theoretic products we get compositionality
of representation. In the next section (Methods), we introduce the
category theory concepts needed for this explanation. Then, we
present our explanation for systematicity in regard to recursively
defined capacities, with specific examples (Results). Finally
(Discussion), we provide some perspective on our explanation in
terms of its potential limits, and some broader aspects of cognition,
including integration with non-systematic capacities, and the
debate over the relationship between recursion, number and
language in humans and other species.
Methods
Our approach to systematicity in recursive domains employs
standard category theory constructs and methods that can be
found in many general introductions to category theory (see, e.g.,
[8,13–15]), and more detailed treatments of F-algebras and
recursion (see, e.g., [16,17]). A semi-formal presentation is
provided here to facilitate an intuitive understanding of the
background theory, with an expanded treatment provided in Text
S1.
Category
All category theory constructs ‘‘live’’ in a category of some
description. Categories consist of objects and morphisms (or,
maps) between them, satisfying certain conditions. A standard
example is the category Set, which has sets for objects and total
functions between sets for morphisms. One way to think of a
category in regard to cognition is as a cognitive (sub)system where
the objects are (sets of) cognitive states and the morphisms are
state-transforming cognitive processes.
Definition (Category, object, morphism, domain,
codomain, composition). A category C consists of a class of
objects DCD~(A,B,...); and for each pair of object A, B in C, a set
C(A,B) of morphisms (also called arrows, or maps) from A to B
where each morphism f : A?B has A as its domain and B as its
codomain, including the identity morphism 1A : A?A for each object
A; and a composition operation, denoted ‘‘0’’, of morphisms
f : A?B and g : B?C, written g0f : A?C that satisfies the laws
of:
N identity, where f01A~f~1B0f, for all f : A?B; and
N associativity, where h0(g0f)~(h0g)0f, for all f : A?B, g : B
?C and h : C?D.
For our purposes, we use the set-like category CPO of complete
partially ordered sets and continuous functions (see [15] for an
introduction). As the term suggests, a complete partial order is a set
with a partial order defined over it, plus some additional
requirements (see Text S1). Though the technical details are
important as part of a category-theoretic foundation for recursion,
and thereby our explanation of systematicity, we omit the details
here as they are not needed to convey the other concepts. Hence,
for expository purposes, our examples use the category Set.W e
refer to CPO when being explicit about the category employed in
our explanation for systematicity. Furthermore, in CPO, each
object A (except the empty set) includes a least element, denoted \,
where \ ƒa for all a[A, and each morphism f : A?B preserves
this element, i.e., f(\) is the least element in B. A least element is
interpreted as the ‘‘undefined’’, or ‘‘unknown’’ value. In cognitive
terms, a system responds with unknown when given an unknown
input. So, morphisms in CPO (Results section) are implicitly
defined over these elements.
Certain objects and morphisms have special properties that
warrant giving them names. In particular, an initial object is an
object for which there is a morphism from it to every object in a
category that has one; a terminal object is an object for which there
is a morphism to it from every object in a category that has one.
For example, in Set the initial object is the empty set, and a
terminal object is any singleton (one-element) set. Initial and
terminal objects are our first examples of universal constructs, and
play an important role in our explanation of systematicity.
Definition (Initial object). An initial object in a category C is
an object, denoted 0, such that for every object A in C there exists
a unique morphism u : 0?A in C.
Definition (Terminal object). A terminal object in a category
C is an object, denoted 1, such that for every object A in C there
exists a unique morphism u : A?1 in C.
Category theory employs a weaker, though more useful notion
of ‘‘equality’’ called isomorphism. Two isomorphic constructs may
be regarded as essentially the same, even though they are not
identical. The notion of isomorphism commonly used in cognitive
science derives from the mathematical versions of isomorphism,
and the category theory notion of isomorphism is the most general
of these.
Definition (Isomorphism). A morphism f : A?B is an
isomorphism if and only if there exists a morphism g : B?A, such
that g0f~1A and f0g~1B.I fg exists, then it is said to be the
inverse of f (also denoted f {1). If f : A?B is an isomorphism, then
A is said to be isomorphic to B, written A%B.
Category theory also provides two basic, principled means of
combining objects, called product and coproduct, where the prefix
‘‘co’’ is often used to label dual constructions, i.e., constructions
obtained by reversing the directions of the morphisms of the other
construct. One can think of a (co)product as a syntax-free notion of
compositionality. Note that not all products and coproducts
actually exist in all categories.
Definition (Product of objects). A product of objects A and B
in category C is, up to a unique isomorphism, an object P (also
denoted A|B) together with two morphisms (sometimes called
projections) p1 : P?A and p2 : P?B, jointly expressed as (P,p1,p2),
such that for every object Z[ DCD and pair of morphisms f : Z?A
and g : Z?B there exists a unique morphism u : Z?P, also
denoted Sf,gT, such that the following diagram commutes:
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A1,...,An is (A1|...|An,p1,...,pn). In the category Set, for
example, the Cartesian product S1|...|Sn of n sets is a product
of those sets in the categorical sense. The projections pi, for
i[f1,...,ng, are the maps pi : (s1,...,sn).si. The symbol .
indicates a mapping of an element in a domain, so f : x.y is the
same as saying f(x)~y.
(‘‘Commute’’ means that any two paths, with at least one path
composed of more than one morphism, with the same start object
and the same end object are equal, e.g., f~p10Sf,gT, in Diagram
1.)
Definition (Coproduct of objects). A coproduct of objects A
and B in category C is, up to a unique isomorphism, an object Q
(also denoted AzB) together with two morphisms q1 : A?Q and
q2 : B?Q, jointly expressed as (Q,q1,q2), such that for every
object Z[ DCD and pair of morphisms f : A?Z and g : B?Z
there exists a unique morphism u : Z?P, also denoted ½f,g , such
that the following diagram commutes:
By a straightforward extension, the finite coproduct of n objects
A1,...,An is (A1z...zAn,q1,...,qn).
Functor
Functors provide a principled means for relating categories. In
the context of categories as cognitive systems, functors provide a
means for relating cognitive systems in a structurally consistent
manner. One can think of a functor as a kind of function between
categories that maps objects and morphisms in a way that
preserves identities and compositions–ordinary functions only map
objects, not morphisms. However, the requirement that identities
and compositions are preserved means that not every such
function is a functor.
Definition (Functor). A functor F : C?D is a map from a
category C to a category D that associates each object A in C to an
object F(A) in D; and each morphism f : A?B in C to a
morphism F(f) : F(A)?F(B) in D, and is structure-preserving in
that F(1A)~1F(A) for each object A in C, and
F(g0Cf)~F(g)0DF(f) for all morphisms f : A?B and g : B?C.
One kind of functor is an endofunctor from a category to itself,
hence its relevance to recursion.
Definition (Endofunctor). An endofunctor F : C?C is a
functor whose domain and codomain are the same category C.
An apparently trivial but actually useful example of an
endofunctor is the identity functor, which maps every object and
morphism to itself.
Other kinds of functors, such as polynomial functors, are also
important for a categorical basis of recursion. The formal details
are provided in Text S1. Intuitively, one can think of a polynomial
functor by analogy to a polynomial function, but with the x of a
normal polynomial replaced by the identity functor, and the
constants of a polynomial replaced by constant functors.
F-Algebra
A category theory treatment of recursion starts with the concept
of an F-algebra constructed on an endofunctor F. One can build up
an intuition of F-algebras from the more familiar notion of
elementary algebra. Elementary algebra consists of operators (e.g.,
negation, addition) that apply to and return numbers. The key
difference is that F-algebra operators are defined in terms of
endofunctors, affording recursion.
Definition (F-algebra). For an endofunctor F : C?C,a nF-
algebra is a pair (A,a), where A is an object and a : F(A)?A is a
morphism in C. For an example, see Text S1.
Definition (F-algebra homomorphism). An F-algebra
homomorphism h : (A,a)?(B,b) is a morphism h : A?B (in C)
such that the following diagram commutes:
That is, h0a~b0F(h).
Definition (Category of F-algebras). For endofunctor
F : C?C, a category of F-algebras Alg(F) has F-algebras (A,a)
for objects, and F-algebra homomorphisms h : (A,a)?(B,b) for
morphisms.
An initial object in a category of F-algebras (if one exists) is
called an initial F-algebra. And, just like an initial object in any other
category (that has one), it is a universal construction: for every F-
algebra in that category there exists a unique F-algebra
homomorphism to it from an initial algebra, hence the importance
of initial algebras to the systematicity of recursive capacities.
Definition (Initial algebra). An initial F-algebra (A,in),
hereafter also simply called an initial algebra, is an initial object in
the category of F-algebras Alg(F). That is, there exists a unique F-
algebra homomorphism from (A,in) to every F-algebra in Alg(F).
Definition (Catamorphism). A catamorphism h : (A,in)?
(B,b) is the unique F-algebra homomorphism from initial F-
algebra (A,in) to F-algebra (B,b). That is, h0in~b0F(h), and the
uniquely specified h for each such b is denoted cata b (i.e.,
h~cata b), as indicated in the following diagram:
(Catamorphisms are also denoted by so-called banana brackets, see
[18].)
Duals: F-algebra, initial algebra, and catamorphism have dual
constructs called F-coalgebra, final coalgebra, and anamorphism
(respectively), which are also used in our explanation for
systematicity. Details are provided in Text S1. Here, we just note
that, like product and coproduct, they are related by reversal of the
directions of the morphisms that are involved in their respective
definitions.
An initial F-algebra for lists
An initial algebra for lists provides our category theory basis for
an explanation of systematicity with respect to list-related cognitive
capacities, such as identifying the smallest or largest item. More
formal details are provided in Text S1. For an intuitive
understanding, recall (from the Introduction) our informal
definition of a deck of cards as being a top card and a (remaining)
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list, which is a head element and a (remaining) list, or an empty
list. So, list-related processing generally has two aspects: one for
empty lists and one for processing non-empty lists, which consist of
a head, and a remaining list (tail). In category theory terms, an
initial algebra for constructing lists is the pair (L,½empty,cons ),
where L is a set of lists, and ½empty,cons  : 1zA|L?L is the list-
constructing morphism, consisting of the constant function
empty : 1?L for constructing the empty list ½ , and the binary
function cons : A|L?L;(a,l).a:l for constructing the list with
element a[A prepended (:) to list l[L. The function cons will be
re-used later in the paper. If, for example, A is the set of natural
numbers N, then L is the set of all finite natural number lists.
Catamorphisms from this initial algebra to an F-algebra
(S,a : 1zA|S?S) have the form of a recursive function
foldL0½Iv,f  : L?S, where foldL0½Iv,f  :
½ .v for some v[S
(a,l).foldL0½If(v,a),f (l)
indicated in commutative diagram
For instance, summing a list of numbers is foldL0
½I0,(z)  : L?N: e.g., foldL0½I0,(z) (½3,2,5 )~(3z(2z(5z(0))))
s10. For a category theory development of various folds, see [17],
and for corresponding concrete implementations in the Haskell
programming language [19], see [20].
Notational convention: For morphisms, 1A indicates the identity
morphism on object A, and Iv : A?V indicates a constant
morphism (function) that maps all elements a[A to the same
element v[V. In Diagram 5, for example, a morphism
1zA|S?S is automatically of the form ½Iv,f  for some v[S
and some f : A|S?S. The names that we shall use for variants
of fold include an object name that is the argument to the
underlying functor. For example, foldL indicates a fold for the set of
lists L. To reduce bracketing, we assume that product (|) binds
more tightly than (i.e., takes precedence over) coproduct (z), so
e.g., 1zA|L~1z(A|L), and arguments to fold bind more
tightly than arguments to the resulting function, so e.g.,
foldL0½I0,(z) (l)~(foldL0½I0,(z) )(l). The prime (0) signifies
folding from the end of the list (or analogous structure, see fold
for numbers in Text S1), as opposed to folding from the front of
the list (foldL, see Text S1). How this difference relates to
systematicity is detailed in Text S1, and discussed in the last
section.
Universal constructions
Specific kinds of universal constructions were used to provide
category theory explanations for the systematicity and quasi-
systematicity of non-recursive relational structures in [6,7]. Initial
algebras (and final coalgebras) are another kind of universal
construction that we use here to extend our explanation of
systematicity to recursive capacities. Universal constructions (if
they exist) in a category are characterized by a single (co)universal
morphism which is a factor (via composition of morphisms) of all
morphisms in the category, hence their relevance to systematicity:
a (co)universal morphism underpins each and every group of
systematically-related cognitive capacities. Initial algebras are
instances of couniversal morphisms; final coalgebras are instances
of universal morphisms (defined in Text S1).
Definition (Couniversal morphism). Given an object
X[DCD and a functor F : B?C,acouniversal morphism from X to
F is a pair (B,y) where B is an object of B, and y is a morphism in
C, such that for every object Y[DBD and every morphism
f : X?F(Y), there exists a unique morphism k : B?Y, such
that F(k)0y~f, as indicated by commutative diagram
Definition (Universal construction). A universal construction
is either a universal morphism, or (its dual) a couniversal
morphism.
Results
Our explanation for systematicity proceeds in two stages: In the
first stage, we use the universal property associated with initial
algebras and catamorphisms to provide a category theory
explanation for systematicity of inference in domains involving
lists, numbers, and trees (relating to language). Systematicity of
inference assumes processes for systematically constructing
representations of the entities from which inference proceeds.
The second stage of our explanation uses the dual notion of a final
coalgebra to provide a corresponding category theory explanation
for systematicity of representation. These two components of our
explanation are necessarily connected, because the structure
morphism fin : A?F(A) of the final coalgebra is the inverse of
the structure morphism in : F(A)?A of the initial algebra for the
functor underlying the category of algebras and coalgebras
considered. The third aspect of systematicity, compositionality of
representation, derives from endofunctors constructed from
products. Since we have already shown that categorical products
explain compositionality of representation [7], we do not repeat
our explanation of this aspect of systematicity here. Then, we turn
our attention to the relationships between these domains, and why
number-, list-, and language-related capacities are not necessarily
systematically related to each other. This result sheds light on why
species and infants can have a capacity for recursion without
having a capacity for language–systematic recursive capacity is
tied to the underlying endofunctor; it is not a language-specific
recursion construct–which we discuss in the next section.
Systematicity: list-related capacities
Working with lists is a common, everyday cognitive activity,
whether it be working through a shopping list, totaling money in
hand, searching for a credit card, or entering an identification
code. The explanation for this kind of systematicity is based on an
initial algebra and associated catamorphisms in a category of F-
algebras on a particular functor F.
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example of systematicity raised (in the Introduction) as a
problem for classical theory: a common task is to select the
smallest or largest item in a collection of items. Systematicity, for
this case, means that if one has the capacity to distinguish the
relative sizes of items, and one has the capacity to identify the
smallest item in a list of items, then one also has the capacity to
identify the largest item in a list of items. Here, we illustrate our
account of systematicity with respect to the natural numbers, i.e.,
where the type A, in the definition of catamorphism (in Diagram
5), is N. For other domains, such as selecting the ripest apple,
largest watermelon, tallest player, etc., A is set to the appropriate
type for that domain. For current purposes, it suffices to set the
fold of an empty list to infinity (i.e., from Diagram 5, v~?),
effectively meaning that the smallest number in any one-item list is
that item. The function f in Diagram 5 is min : (x,y).
x, if xƒy else y, which returns the smaller of two items. So, the
catamorphism for identifying the smallest number is
foldL0½1?,min , as indicated in commutative diagram
For example, foldL0½1?,min (½2,1,3 )~min(2,min(1,min
(3,?)))~1. By replacing min in Diagram 7 with
max : (x,y).x, if x§y else y, and ? with 0 (or {? for lists
of integers or reals), we have the catamorphism that corresponds to
identifying the largest number. For example, foldL0
½10,max (½2,1,3 )~max(2,max(1,max(3,0)))~3. Since the two
computations have the couniversal morphism ½empty,cons  as the
common component, this arrangement accounts for systematicity
with respect to these capacities. Moreover, since the catamorph-
isms are uniquely determined, we have an account of systematicity
without further (ad hoc) assumptions.
Accepting/rejecting/classifying items. A more general
capacity is to select not just a single element from a list, but a
sublist of elements satisfying some criterion. For example, when
picking fruit one selects only the ripe ones based on some criterion
of ripeness. When catching fish, one may reject those below a
certain length. Or, when processing tomatoes, one may classify
them on the basis of size. All such cases are examples of
systematically related capacities: you don’t find people who can
identify the largest tomato without being able to classify them into
small versus large. The initial algebra and catamorphisms that
account for this form of systematicity are shown in commutative
diagram
where f (in Diagram 5) is fp : A|L?L,(a,as).a:as,
if p(a) else as, which is a function that accepts or rejects items
depending on whether they satisfy condition p : A?Bool,
returning True when a[A has the criterion property p, else False.
In the case of classifying items, f (in Diagram 5) is the function cp,
which returns a list of classes, one for each element, according to
some classification criterion. That is, cp : A|L(A)?L(C),
(a,as).c:cs, where p : A?C,a.c is a classification function,
and lists are explicitly labeled with the type of their elements, e.g.,
L(A) indicates a list of type A. If we wish to group items from the
original list into two lists on the basis of item classification, then f is
the function gp : A|L?L|L,(a,as).a:as1, if p(a) else a:as2,
and v~(½ ,½ ), for the empty list, as indicated in commutative
diagram
where list type is not explicitly labeled, since all lists have the same
type. For example, grouping a list of natural numbers into even
and odd numbers is foldl½I½ ,½ ,gisEven (½2,1,5,4,6 )~
(½2,4,6 ,½1,5 ), where isEven : N?Bool, returns True if n[N is
even, otherwise False. Clearly, the capacity for classifying/
grouping items can be generalized to more categories (e.g., small,
medium, large). The explanation for systematicity without ad hoc
assumptions parallels our explanation for systematicity in non-
recursive domains [6,7]: every capacity has as a factor the same
couniversal morphism.
Systematicity: number-related capacities
Number is another domain where humans exhibit systematicity
over recursive capacities. Primary among these capacities are
various forms of counting. Simple counting involves producing the
sequence of numbers starting from a given number, such as
counting the first ten numbers starting from one. Other forms of
counting include modular counting (where the successor of a number
may be 0, e.g., counting in 3’s: 0,1,2,0,1,2,0,...), stepwise counting
(such as counting in steps of two, or three, etc.), and multiple counting
(where two or more counts are performed concurrently). In this
section, we explain why systematicity with regard to these
capacities follows from an F-algebra and catamorphism model
without ad hoc assumptions. First, we present a category of F-
algebras that includes number-related capacities, an initial algebra
for this category and its associated general catamorphism. Then,
we provide catamorphisms specialized to particular number-
related capacities. Further details are given in Text S1.
Simple/stepwise/modular/multiple counting. The
category of F-algebras that includes number-related capacities is
constructed from the polynomial functor F : CPO?CPO;S.
1zS,f.11zf. An initial algebra in this category is
(N,½zero,succ ), where N is a set used to model the natural
numbers (N), ½zero,succ  : 1zN?N, zero : 1?N is a nullary
function (equivalently, a constant) returning the element Zero[N,
and succ : N?N;n.succ(n) is a unary function returning the
successor of element n[N. In this system, the number 2, for
example, corresponds to succ(succ(Zero)). For this initial algebra,
there is a general catamorphism called foldN (i.e., fold for
numbers), defined as foldN½Iv,f  : N?S, where
Zero.v
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f : S?S is a unary function, and v[S is a constant. The initial
algebra and catamorphism are indicated in commutative diagram
A simple counting task is to list out, in order, the first n numbers
starting from a given number m: e.g., listing out the first five
numbers from three yields the sequence: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. The
corresponding computation is an instance of the initial algebra and
catamorphism given in the following commutative diagram:
where f : ½N ?½N ;xs.xs:½succ(last(xs)) , and ½N  is the set of
lists constructed from N, : is the list concatenation operator, and
last : ½N ?N returns the last number x from a list of number xs.
Thus, simple counting starting from m is the parameterized
function gm~foldN½I½m ,f  : N?½N , where m[N.
Another simple counting task is to list out, in order, the first n
numbers from a given number m at intervals of k: e.g., listing out
the first four numbers from 1 at intervals of two yields the
sequence: 1, 3, 5, 7. The corresponding diagram for this
computation employs the same initial algebra and a unique
catamorphism involving foldN in Diagram 11, except that the
function corresponding to f is now defined as:
fk : ½N ?½N ;xs.xs:½(zk)(last(xs)) , where the function
zk : N?N;x.x plus k, and plus is a model for z (see Text
S1). Thus, simple counting by interval is the parameterized function
gm,k~foldN½I½m ,fk  : N?½N .
These and other counting tasks (e.g., modular and multiple
counting, see Text S1) involve the same initial algebra; i.e., the
same couniversal morphism ½zero,succ  : 1zN?N, and a unique
catamorphism involving foldN. Hence, systematicity in regard to
such capacities is explained by this universal construction, without
further (ad hoc) assumptions. In cognitive terms, having the
capacity for simple counting and knowing the interval relation-
ships between numbers (e.g., 5 is two greater than 3) implies
having the capacity to count in twos, because both capacities are
uniquely composed of a common, universal component (namely
½zero, succ ). Thus, the presence or absence of this universal
component is enough to imply the presence or absence of the
entire collection of systematically-related capacities.
Systematicity: language-related capacities
In this domain, we use an artificial grammar (for arithmetic
expressions) to illustrate our explanation for systematicity with
regard to language-related capacities. Artificial grammars are
often used, because their forms are more easily adapted to the
question at hand. We investigate a fragment of natural language
(tail- versus center-embedded sentences), in the next section, in the
context of capacities that may not be systematically related. Up to
this point, we have addressed systematicity with respect to
inference, e.g., why the capacity to infer the smallest list item is
systematically related to the capacity to infer the largest list item–
systematicity of inference. This aspect of systematicity assumes that the
cognitive system also has the capacity to systematically represent
the entities from which such inferences are made–systematicity of
representation. Here, we also provide a category theory explanation
for systematicity of representation, using the closely related, dual
notion of an F-coalgebra.
Arithmetic expressions: systematicity of inference. The
example in this section is based on [21], but adapted to model the
cognitive capacity for evaluating numerical expressions. We first
present a category of F-algebras that includes the language-related
capacities of current interest, its initial algebra and associated
general catamorphism, and then we specialize this catamorphism
for arithmetic expressions (see Text S1, for further details).
The category of F-algebras that includes language-related
capacities is constructed from the polynomial functor
FA : CPO?CPO;S.AzS|S,f.1Azf|f. The F-algebras
for the category Alg(FA) can be represented as pairs (S,½f,g ),
where ½f,g  : AzS|S?S, f : A?S is a unary function, and
g : S|S?S is a binary function. An initial algebra in this
category is (T,½leaf,branch ), where T is the set of trees of type A,
½leaf,branch  : AzT|T?T, leaf : A?T;a.SaT returns a
tree consisting of a single leaf a[A, and branch : T|
T?T;(l,r).Sl,rT returns a tree consisting of a left branch l
and a right branch r, where l,r[T. For example, a binary tree of
numbers SS1T,SS2T,S3TTT has a leaf 1 as its left branch, and a
tree, with left leaf 2 and a right leaf 3, as its right branch. A
catamorphism from initial algebra (T,½leaf,branch ) to an
arbitrary F-algebra (S,½f,g ) in Alg(FA) is the recursive function
foldT (i.e., fold for trees), defined as follows. The (higher-order)
function foldT takes a unary function f : A?S and a binary
function g : S|S?S and returns the recursive function
foldT½f,g  : T?S, where
SaT.f(a)
Sl,rT.g(foldT½f,g (l),foldT½f,g (r))
and T is a set of trees of type A, indicated in commutative diagram
Suppose participants are given arithmetic expressions involving
a particular operator, say, addition, e.g., (1z2)z(2z3), which
they are required to evaluate. Given that participants can correctly
evaluate such expressions, there is a host of other capacities that
are also afforded provided that they have some other basic
knowledge. For example, given knowledge of another binary
operator, say, subtraction, participants can also evaluate the related
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the addition case is given in commutative diagram
For the case of subtraction, the binary operator (z) for addition is
replaced with ({) in Diagram 13. Hence, the second task is
computed as foldT½1N,({) . The universal construction common
to these two capacities is the couniversal morphism ½leaf,branch .
So, the explanation for systematicity is essentially the same as the
explanations we provided for list- and number-related capacities,
albeit based on a different underlying functor–the capacities for
evaluating expressions involving addition and subtraction contain
½leaf,branch  as the common factor.
The addition and subtraction examples only consider cases
where each expression consists of only one kind of operator. A
more developed ability is the capacity to evaluate expressions that
include different operators, e.g., (2z4){(3{1). Such expressions
require trees that explicitly include each operator, e.g., the tree
Sz,1,S{,2,3TT corresponds to the expression 1z(2{3).A n
initial algebra for such expressions is based on the functor
FN,O : CPO?CPO;S.NzO|S|S,f.1Nz1O|f|f.A n
initial algebra is ½leaf,root  : NzO|T|T?T, where
root : (op,l,r).Sop,l,rT, and O~fz,{,   ,=g is the set of
arithmetic operators. Here, the set of numbers N includes the
reals. This example can be extended further by considering
expressions that include operators of different arities, as in the
expression ({8)z4. This extension requires yet another kind of
tree algebra based on the functor FN,O : CPO?CPO;S
.NzO|SzO|S|S,f.1Nz1O|fz1O|f|f. These po-
ssibilities raise the question of which tree to construct. Both
systematicity of representation and the problem of determining
which tree are addressed using the dual notion of an F-coalgebra,
which we turn to next.
Arithmetic expressions: systematicity of represen-
tation. The previous section considered various systematically-
related capacities for evaluating trees. These examples are
instances of systematicity of inference [1,4,6]. Yet, such expressions
are not given to the cognitive system in tree-form. Typically, such
trees are assumed to be constructed from an input (list of
characters) by another process. The input may take on several
different formats: e.g., alpha-numeric, as in 1z(2z3), or word
form, as in one plus (two plus three), which correspond to the same
tree. Again, these two forms are systematically related: one has the
capacity to represent the expression 1z(2z3) if and only if one
has the capacity to represent the expression one plus (two plus three)
assuming, of course, a person knows that one, two and three denote
the same things as 1, 2 and 3 (respectively), and plus denotes the
same thing as z. This form of systematicity is called systematicity of
representation [1,4,6]. In this section, we show how systematicity of
representation is addressed using coalgebras. Since a coalgebra on
a functor F is intimately tied to its dual algebra on F, coalgebras
also address the problem of determining which tree to construct.
Constructing trees from lists is achieved by a dual construction
called an F-coalgebra [21] (see Text S1, for definitions). The
explanation for systematicity in this case proceeds in a ‘‘dual’’
manner: i.e., every morphism in a category of F-coalgebras with a
terminal (dual to initial) object, called a final coalgebra (dual to initial
algebra) is composed of a unique anamorphism (dual to catamorph-
ism) and a common final coalgebra. (Note the reversal in the order
of composition compared with F-algebras.)
The development of the concept of final coalgebra derives from
the dual definition of the concept of initial algebra, in this case in
the category of F-algebras Alg(FA) on the functor
FA : CPO?CPO;S.AzS|S,f.1Azf|f. A final coalgebra
in the dual category CoAlg(FA) is (T,(pST?fmleaf,fmbranch)),
where conditional pST?fmleaf,fmbranch consists of a condition
pST : T?Bool that tests whether t[T is a leaf (i.e., t~SaT,a[A),
or a branch (i.e., t~Sl,rT,l,r[T), and associates functions
fmleaf : T?A,SaT.a, for retrieving a value from a leaf, and
fmbranch : T?T|T,Sl,rT.(l,r), for retrieving a pair of left and
right subtrees from a branch. There are more details on
conditional functions in Text S1 and [9]. The dual category
CoAlg(FA) has F-coalgebras (S,(p?f,g)) as objects, and F-
coalgebra homomorphisms as morphisms. The anamorphism
associated with this final coalgebra is called unfoldT (i.e., unfold for
trees), defined recursively as unfoldT(p?f,g) : S?T
s.Sf(s)T if p(s)
s.SunfoldT(p?f,g)(p10g(s)),unfoldT(p?f,g)(p20g(s)T
otherwise
The final coalgebra and associated anamorphism are indicated in
commutative diagram
Diagram 14 indicates the general form of the anamorphism
from which we need to specify a particular p?f,g for our domain
of arithmetic expressions. That is, we need to define the test
function p : L?Bool, where Bool~fTrue,Falseg that deter-
mines whether an expression (i.e., list of characters, such as
‘‘1+(2+3)’’) indicates a simple (value) or complex expression, and
associated functions f : L?N and g : L?L|L for transforming
simple expressions into numbers and complex expressions into
pairs of expressions, respectively.
Specifications of f and g (in Diagram 14) are obtained from case
analysis. Examples of simple expressions, which indicate values,
are: ‘‘1’’, ‘‘(2)’’, and ‘‘((3))’’, i.e., any well-formed expression that
does not contain the ‘‘+’’ character. A complex expression is any
well-formed expression that is not simple. So, p is the function
isVal : l.‘‘z’’= [l (and l is a well-formed expression). Later, we
show how this extends to other operators. Since f is associated
with p(l) being true, we require a function to convert a string into
a (internal) representation for the corresponding number, i.e., f is
the function str2num : L?N that converts a string of characters
like ‘‘123’’ to the corresponding number 123. Finally, we need a
function g for complex expressions. Examples of complex
expressions include: ‘‘1+2’’, ‘‘1+(2+3)’’, ‘‘(1+2)+3’’,
‘‘(1+2)+(3+4)’’, and so on. The purpose of g is to split an
expression into two subexpressions, one corresponding to the left
branch of the tree, and the other to the right branch. That is, g
must split the expression at the topmost operator into two
subexpressions containing the strings before and after the ‘‘+’’
symbol, after stripping off the outer brackets. Identifying the split
point is also determined by case analysis: Basically, the split point
is the first instance of ‘‘+’’ in the absence of an unmatched right
bracket ‘‘)’’. So, one simply maintains a counter, starting from 0
(i.e., no unmatched brackets, or top level), which is incremented/
decremented on every occurrence of a left/right bracket, when
read from left to right, and on finding a ‘‘+’’ when the counter is 0,
Categorial Compositionality III
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e35028splits the string at this point. For example, ‘‘(1+2)+3’’ is split into
‘‘(1+2)’’ and ‘‘3’’. g is this function split : L?L|L. Thus, the
function for parsing expressions into trees is the anamorphism
unfoldT(isVal?str2num,split).
Systematicity of representation (in this example, constructing
trees) is obtained in the same way as systematicity of inference
(destructing trees). Destruct is used in a technical sense as the dual to
construct: e.g., to destruct a tree is to pull apart its constituents,
which are either the left and right subtrees in the case of a branch,
or the value of the leaf in the case of a leaf (see also Text S1). To
represent the same tree from the expressions in word form, one
simply replaces the argument isVal?str2num,split as appropri-
ate. Thus, the function str2num is replaced with word2num which
converts numbers in word form (e.g., ‘‘one’’, ‘‘two’’, etc.) to their
corresponding internal representation of number, and isVal
searches for the string ‘‘plus’’ rather than ‘‘+’’. In any case, the
resulting anamorphism factors through the same universal
morphism, i.e., pST?fmleaf,fmbranch from Diagram 14.
Given initial algebra in : F(A)?A in a category Alg(F), the
corresponding final coalgebra fin : A?F(A) is guaranteed to
exist, because F(A)%A, and indeed in has as inverse fin. Thus,
further (ad hoc) assumptions are not required to guarantee a
correspondence between expressions and evaluations since they
are indivisibly bound by the initial algebra/final coalgebra. By
contrast, classical theory assumes that the processes for construct-
ing syntactically compositional representations and the processes
for systematically transforming those representations correspond
[6]. Naturally, this result extends to other kinds of (final) initial
(co)algebras, such as those pertaining to lists (see Text S1, for
further details).
Numbers, lists, and languages: are they systematically
related?
The short answer is: No. A more technical explanation is
provided in Text S1. Here, we simply point to the differences
between the respective F-algebra categories, which are made
obvious from the commutative diagrams for the initial algebras in
each category. The basic point is that although tree-related
capacities subsume list-related capacities, which in turn subsume
number-related capacities (because, e.g., numbers can be repre-
sented as lists of 1s–in effect tally marks) the converse is not true:
having a capacity for number does not in general afford a capacity
for lists, which in turn does not in general afford a capacity for
trees.
Notice from the commutative diagrams indicating initial
algebras for number (Diagram 10), list (Diagram 5), and tree
(Diagram 12) that the underlying endofunctor has a different form.
The endofunctor underlying the F-algebra category including
number, i.e., F : S.1zS,f.1zf is an unparameterized
polynomial functor of order one (cf. polynomial functions). For
lists, the endofunctor is the parameterized polynomial functor of
order one, FA : S?1zA|S,f.11z1A|f, or equivalently,
binomial functor F(A,S). For language-related trees, the endo-
functor is the parameterized polynomial functor of order two,
FA : S?AzS|S,f.1Azf|f, or the functor FA : S?1z
A|S|S,f.11z1A|f|f. So, although a tree can be used to
model a list, and a list can be used to model a number, generally, a
number cannot be used to model a list, and a list cannot be used to
model a tree in any natural way. Technically, that is to say, the
three endofunctors are not related by natural equivalences (see
Text S1). Thus, the forms of recursion that afford systematic
cognitive capacity with regard to number do not afford systematic
cognitive capacity with regard to list, nor tree, and likewise
systematic capacity with regard to list does not afford systematic
capacity with regard to tree.
Natural language: Tail- versus center-embedded
recursion. A caveat to the distinction between number, list,
and tree involves tail- versus center-embedded recursive
constructions that are found in natural languages. The following
example is taken from [22]. An example of a tail-embedded
construction is This is the cat that killed the rat that ate the malt that lay in
the house that Jack built. This expression in center-embedded form is
The malt that the rat that the cat killed ate lay in the house that Jack built.I n
general form, we have production rules S?eDabS for tail-
embedded sentences, and S?eDaSb for center-embedded
sentences, where e is the symbol for the empty string. Such
constructions are indicative of the difference between regular
grammars and context-free grammars. However, from the
perspective of F-algebras, both are realized by list-related
functors, albeit of different forms. The tail-embedded case is
included in the category of F-algebras on the functor
Ft
A,B : S.A|BzA|B|S,f.1A|1Bz1A|1B|f, which
includes the initial F-algebra for constructing lists such as ½a1,b1 ,
½a1,b1,a2,b2 , etc. The center-embedded case is included in the
category of F-algebras on the functor Fc
A,B : S.A|
BzA|S|B,f.1A|1Bz1A|f|1B, which includes the
initial F-algebra for constructing lists such as ½a1,b1 ,
½a1,a2,b2,b1 , etc. However, these two functors are related by a
natural isomorphism, suggesting that they are systematically
related. We discuss the implications of this commonality in the
next section.
Discussion
Our explanation for systematicity with regard to recursive
domains employs the same general category theory construct–
universal construction–as our previous explanations for (quasi-
)systematicity in regard to non-recursive domains [6,7], albeit with
different kinds of functors: here, for recursive domains, the
universal constructions involved endofunctors (i.e., where the
domain and codomain are the same category), whereas for non-
recursive domains, the universal constructions involved adjoint
functors (which are reciprocating, though not necessarily inverse,
functorial maps between categories that are not necessarily the
same. Every composition of left and right adjoints is an
endofunctor, but not every endofunctor can be decomposed into
a pair of adjoint functors. So, having some (primitive) form of
systematicity over a recursive domain does not imply having
systematicity for non-recursive domains. Nor, for that matter, does
having the systematicity property for one recursive domain (e.g.,
numbers) imply the having the systematicity property for another
recursive domain (e.g., lists), when the universal constructions
involve functors not related by a natural isomorphism (this
distinction also applies to non-recursive domains). See any of
[8,13,15,16] or Text S1 for a technical description of the concept
of naturality. This functorial distinction between universal
constructions has important implications for comparative and
developmental psychology, which we discuss later.
This category theory explanation goes significantly beyond the
classical one, despite some similarity between the two. The
similarity between the two explanations lies in the use of common
subprocesses underlying each and every member of a group of
systematically-related cognitive capacities, which was the case in
our explanation for non-recursive systematic capacities [6,7]. In
the case of recursive systematic capacities, the capacities are also
intrinsically connected by two common subprocesses that are
necessarily inverses of each other. Where we also go beyond the
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between commonalities that are universal (universal constructions),
and those that are not (i.e., not necessarily universal). Note that we
are not providing an ‘‘explanation’’ of systematicity by simply
(re)defining it in the terms of some alternative, formal language.
The formal concept of a universal construction has precise,
empirically testable implications, a general schema for which we
provided in Text S2. Hence, we can test the limits of systematicity,
and thereby the limits of our theoretical explanation. Thus,
although it may not seem obvious that adding a list of numbers is
closely related to finding the smallest number (both involve a fold
over lists), such cases can be put to an empirical test.
Our explanation for systematicity is based on universal
constructions, but we require that the universal constructions
arise from functors that are related by natural transformations, as
we did previously: natural transformations were part of our
explanation for non-recursive capacities in the form of universal
constructions that are adjunctions–every adjunction consists of two
natural transformations, and a collection of (co)universal morph-
isms.
Limitations
There are two points at which our theory is likely to be
incomplete: one point is where competence meets performance,
such as when supposed systematically related capacities span
memory or cognitive complexity limits (see [23] for a review and
discussion of both kinds of limits). The other point is where
systematic cognition meets non-systematic cognition: not all
cognition is regarded as systematic; idioms (e.g., John kicked the
bucket–i.e., he died–is not systematic with Mary kicked the bucket [with
her foot]) are an example [1]. We discuss our theory in the context
of both cases.
An example of the first point (competence versus performance)
is the case of lists where the morphism f is not associative (e.g.,
subtraction): computing with a right-fold version of list fold means
keeping all list items in memory (if presented once only), so
systematicity would not extend beyond lists of more than a few
items. Such cases are generally not regarded as evidence against
the systematicity property–human cognition is ceteris paribus (e.g.,
memory requirements being the same) largely systematic (see [2]).
Nonetheless, a more complete theory will address both aspects of
cognition. Category theory may also provide independent
principles for performance, since cognitive development-related
limits in children were identified with the arity of the (co)product
underlying the task [24]: e.g., the ability of children older than the
median age of five years to perform transitive inference and class
inclusion in the more difficult–cognitively complex–condition
versus children younger than five was related to (co)product arity,
i.e., binary versus unary (co)products. Note that here, too, the
difference in ‘‘complexity’’ of the endofunctors for number (no/
unary product of functors), list (binary product of constant and
identity functors) and tree (binary product of two identity functors,
or ternary product of constant and two identity functors). Product
arity does not appear to distinguish the endofunctors underlying
center-embedded versus tail-embedded recursion (their underlying
functors are related by a natural isomorphism), yet center-
embedded recursion is generally more difficult than tail-embedded
recursion and appears to be unique to humans [22]. However,
center-embedded recursion requires keeping all unmatched items
in memory, so in expanded form center-embedded recursion
employs a higher arity product. Nonetheless, performance
(resource) related differences are beyond the scope of our theory
as it currently stands.
In regard to the second point (systematic versus non-systematic
cognition), category theory also provides a principled means for
joining two cognitive (sub)systems via (co)products of categories
(see Text S1, for a (co)product of categories definition), where one
category models systematic cognitive capacity and the other non-
systematic capacity, and (say) the coproduct category models both.
An example of integrating systems with products is a hybrid
distributive-symbolic model of grammar [25], where one category
employs symbols and the other vectors. However, as Aizawa [4]
explains, the required explanatory standard for hybrid theories is
higher, because one must also explain why/when component
theories are invoked. One possible reason is efficiency. Recall that
a primitive form of addition was supported (systematically) by the
category of F-algebras that included number-related capacities via
foldN, where the number of iterations was proportional to the size
of the addends. The time required to add numbers can be reduced
(and so efficiency increased) by memorizing the addition table for
small numbers, which is what children are taught to do. However,
addition via memorized associations is not a systematic process:
one can memorize part of a table without memorizing the other
part (this example is an analog of the phrase-book example in
language [1]). So, utility may drive the cognitive system to employ
a faster, though non-systematic process. However, utility is also
outside the scope of our current theory. To meet this raised
explanatory standard, one must explain why and under what
conditions either component is employed, without resorting to ad
hoc assumptions.
These sorts of questions can be put to an empirical test using the
general schema for (non-)recursive systematicity detailed in Text
S2. The basic format of this schema says that if participants have
the capacity for the (co)universal component, and its composition
with task specific components, then it must have the capacity for
other tasks composed of the same (co)universal component.
Success on a new task instance, i.e., without further feedback
regarding the correct response, is an empirical test of systematicity.
Perspective
At the core of our category theory explanation for systematic
recursive capacity is a special pair of dual constructions: an (final)
initial (co)algebra in a category of (co)algebras on a polynomial
functor F. Although one can reverse the direction of any collection
of arrows to form a dual, such duals may not exist in the category
of interest (e.g., the existence of products in some category does
not automatically guarantee the existence of coproducts in the
same category). Yet, for categories of (co)algebras on a polynomial
functor (final) initial (co)algebras are guaranteed to exist [16], and
an initial algebra in : F(A)?A is guaranteed to have an inverse
fin : A?F(A), because the component objects are isomorphic
(i.e., A%F(A)), which constitutes a final coalgebra for the domains
we have investigated. For polynomial functors, in general, an
initial algebra (final coalgebra) is given uniquely by a final
coalgebra (initial algebra), see [21]. So, the systematic relationship
between representation and inference is guaranteed without
further (ad hoc) assumptions, in contrast to the classical explanation
where the link between the two is just assumed [6]. Notice,
moreover, that this dual relationship between systematicity of
representation and systematicity of inference is more general (and
more useful) than an inverse. In the arithmetic expressions
example, lists were represented as trees (systematicity of represen-
tation), but trees were evaluated as numbers (systematicity of
inference). This form of duality goes beyond the simple inverse
relationship between sentence recognition and generation found in
parsing/production rules in a classical approach to language.
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e35028The capacity for recursion has been a contentious issue in the
broader interests of cognitive science, which includes comparative
and developmental psychology. Some argue that recursion is
specific to humans and depends on language [26]; more
particularly, a fully inductive (recursive) basis for number is
specific to adults and distinct from infants’ non-inductive basis
[27]. In contrast, others claim a human language-like capacity for
recursion in songbirds [28] (but, see [22]), and that adult
understanding of number (in its fully induced form) is founded
on a more primitive infant conception [29]. See also [30], for a
review of the debate over the link between number and language.
Our category theory treatment of recursive cognitive capacities
provides a different perspective on this issue: specifically, as we
have shown, the particular systematic capacities for recursion
depend on the underlying functor, not a general capacity for
recursion, as such. In particular, one can have a basic recursive
capacity for number without having a full-blown capacity for
language, because the functor underlying recursive number-
related capacities does not provide a systematic basis for recursive
language-related capacities, though by our account language-
related recursive capacities afford number-related recursive
capacities. Analysis of the songbird evidence [28] for supposed
center-embedded recursion suggested that these birds were using a
simple counting strategy [22], which accords with our F-(co)alge-
braic basis for recursion in cognition, where simple counting
involves a fold for numbers, not lists or trees. Thus, other species
(and infants) can have elementary recursive capacities without
implying a full-blown capacity for number and language as they
are available in adult humans.
The development of category-theoretic approaches to recursion
in programming language design and automated refinement
would seem to have little to do with a theory of cognitive
architecture. Why, then, would one want to consider it as an
approach to systematicity? In fact, the importance of the
systematicity property to cognitive biological systems parallels
the importance of abstraction in software systems engineering.
Universal constructions in software design afford both economy of
coding, and robustness: every call to an existing function obviates
the need to write further code, and guarantees ‘‘correctness’’
across the various instantiations. That is, the same lines of code
when called are guaranteed to work the same way every time; by
contrast, any new line of code is ‘‘likely to introduce a new bug
50% of the time’’ (programmers’ folklore). So, although the
applications differ, the underlying principle is the same, and one
can envisage evolution favouring the emergence of systematic
processes because of the reproductive advantage afforded by this
kind of efficiency. For this reason, category-theoretic approaches,
which have worked well in theoretical computer science, are
appropriate as an approach to the systematicity problem.
The goals of the cognitive and computer scientist are not
entirely the same, of course. One potential point of divergence is
with the origins of the structures underlying (cognitive) computa-
tion: computer scientists specify computational structures and
identify their properties, whereas cognitive scientists are also
concerned with their development/acquisition. Earlier categorical
computational work focussed more heavily on F-algebras, while F-
coalgebras were relatively underdeveloped [31]. For the systema-
ticity problem, we see both as equally important, and their
intrinsic connection suggests that their (co)habitation is important
for a more complete theory of cognitive architecture. Just as the
needs of computer scientists spurred the further development of F-
(co)algebras for computing, the needs of cognitive scientists may
spur yet further category theory development in this area. One
area for future development is an account of how the universal
constructions that we have proposed in our explanation for
systematicity are modeled (implemented) by neural systems.
The classicist’s approach to cognitive architecture is fundamen-
tally limited not in advocating syntax, but in placing syntax at the
foundation of their theory. Given the often ad hoc and idiosyncratic
choices that go into programming language design, computer
scientists in recent decades have turned to category theory for a
deeper syntax-free understanding of the principles of computation.
Cognitive science, as couched within the framework of computa-
tionalism, can likewise do better than lay foundations on the
shifting sands of syntax.
We have adapted category theory principles for the beginnings
of a categorial computational theory of cognitive architecture. Yet,
if the answer to the systematicity problem is universal construc-
tions, then the question that follows is, How do the processes
corresponding to universal constructions arise in the evolution/development of
minds? Perhaps, here too, category theory will provide an answer.
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